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Abstract 
Do our minds extend beyond our brains? In a series of publications, Mark Row-
lands has argued that the correct answer to this question is an affirmative one. 
According to Rowlands, certain types of operations on bodily and worldly struc-
tures should be considered to be proper and literal parts of our cognitive and men-
tal processes. In this article, I present and critically evaluate Rowlands' position. 
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1. Two Types of Externalism 
Perhaps the best known variety of externalism is the semantic or content external-
ism. This is the type of externalism associated with the works of Putnam (1975) and 
Burge (1975). It holds that the contents of some mental states of a subject S depend 
for their individuation on factors external to S. Assuming that there are mental 
states that possess their content essentially, then semantic externalism turns out to 
be a thesis about the individuation of those mental states. And although it can also 
be understood as a thesis about the constitution or location of mental states (given 
certain assumptions about the nature of mental content), typically it is not.
50 As a 
thesis about mental or cognitive states, semantic externalism does not commit one 
to  an  externalist  thesis  concerning  the  nature  of  mental  or  cognitive  processes. 
That is to say, whereas the contents of certain cognitive states might depend on 
external factors, the cognitive processes that give rise to those cognitive states can 
                                                           
48 Please note that sections 4 and 5 of this essay draw heavily upon material found in Elpidorou (2012). 
And  although  these  two  sections  ultimately  develop,  and  expand  upon,  ideas  and  themes  found  in 
Elpidorou (2012), there is still substantial overlap between the two works.  
49 I am grateful to two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments and suggestions.  
50 For further discussion on this issue, see Rowlands (2006) and Rupert (2004). Where is my mind? 
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still be internal: they can still be located inside the head of the subject (or organ-
ism)  insofar  as  they  can  be  identical  to,  or  realized  exclusively  by,  brain 
processes.
51  
Semantic externalism can be contrasted with a different type of externalism: ve-
hicle externalism. Whereas the former is a thesis (primarily, at least) about the 
individuation of the content of mental states, the latter is a thesis about the consti-
tution and location of the vehicles of those states. Vehicle externalism, I shall as-
sume, is the thesis according to which mental or cognitive processes may extend 
beyond  the  brain.  That  is,  vehicle  externalism  denies  that  mental  or  cognitive 
processes have to be identical to, or exclusively realized by, brain processes. In-
stead,  certain  types  of  operations  on  bodily  and  worldly  structures  can  also  be 
proper parts of mental or cognitive processes. (Henceforth, the expression “cogni-
tive process” will be understood broadly, insofar as “cognitive process” and “men-
tal process” are assumed to be co-referential.) 
For over a decade, Rowlands has been arguing in support of vehicle externalism. 
He has maintained that some cognitive processes do not merely depend on exter-
nal processes, but are constituted by them. To be clear, Rowlands’ claim is not that 
there  are  purely  external  cognitive  processes;  nor  does  he  hold  that  cognitive 
processes must be externally constituted. For Rowlands, external processes (i.e., 
the manipulation or transformation of information-bearing items that are located 
outside the boundaries of the brain) only partly and contingently constitute cogni-
tive processes.
52 External processes, in other words, can be literal parts of some 
cognitive processes. In what follows, I present and evaluate Rowlands’ externalist 
account of the mind.  
 
2. The Evolution of Cognition 
Why should we accept vehicle externalism? Rowlands argues that there are evolu-
tionary reasons it its favor (1999: 64-99; 2003: 162-9). Suppose that an organism 
needs to accomplish a task T and that the successful completion of T increases the 
probability of survival of the organism or organisms of that lineage. Suppose fur-
                                                           
51 Semantic externalism can also be true even if the phenomenal character of experiences is narrowly 
individuated. In other words, even if the semantics of a phenomenally conscious state is externally 
individuated, its phenomenality need not be. 
52  A  process  is  external  if  the  structures  that  it  manipulates,  exploits,  or  transforms  lie  outside  the 
boundaries of the brain. Difficulties pertaining to how to precisely circumscribe the brain’s boundaries 
can be sidestepped. There is no need to adjudicate whether glial cells or the spinal cord, for instance, 
constitute parts of the brain. Rowlands’ objective is unaffected by such adjudication. His aim is to show 
that processes incorporating structures that clearly and unambiguously lie outside the boundaries of the 
brain  can  partly  constitute  cognitive  processes.  Regardless  of  how  liberally  one  might  draw  the 
boundaries of the brain, it is unlikely that muscular compositions or artificial tools, for instance, will 
turn out to be parts of the brain. AVANT Volume III, Number 1/2012 www.avant.edu.pl/en 
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ther that there is a “choice” between two evolutionary strategies in accomplishing 
T: a manipulative and a non-manipulative strategy. The former consists in the ma-
nipulation and use of certain environmental structures by the organism. The latter 
does not – or if it does, it does so to a substantially lesser extent than the manipula-
tive strategy. In the scenario according to which the adopted strategy is a non-
manipulative one, evolutionary forces result in the development and maintenance 
of certain features of the organism that permit it to accomplish T. Whereas in the 
non-manipulative scenario the organism does all or most the work in accomplish-
ing T, in the manipulative scenario the environment is used in a way as to do some 
of the work for the organism. Here is an example: suppose that T is the task of lift-
ing a weight. A manipulative strategy might involve building a lever, the use of 
which will allow the organism to perform T. A non-manipulative strategy will in-
stead consist in the organism growing stronger so as to be able to lift the weight by 
itself. Rowlands holds that “strategies that involve the manipulation by organisms 
of structures in their environment typically (but not necessarily, and perhaps not 
even  always)  have  a  more  favorable  [evolutionary]  cost–benefit  analysis  than 
strategies which do not” (1999: 74). Manipulative strategies are thus typically more 
selectively advantageous than non-manipulative ones. Assuming that (i) the reason 
why cognitive processes have evolved is to accomplish evolutionarily determined 
tasks  and  (ii)  cognitive  processes  have  followed  the  most  efficient  evolutionary 
route, then evolutionary considerations provide support for vehicle externalism: 
evolution favors manipulative strategies in accomplishing cognitive tasks and ma-
nipulative  strategies  give  rise  to  (at  least  some)  cognitive  processes  that  extend 
beyond the boundaries of the organism.  
 
Although suggestive, the argument is not conclusive. First, it is unclear whether 
assumptions (i) and (ii) should be granted. Rowlands recognizes this difficulty. In 
response, he treats the argument as a conditional one: if we are correct to assume 
(i) and (ii), then evolutionary theory can be used as support for vehicle external-
ism. But skepticism about (i) and (ii) notwithstanding, there are additional prob-
lems with the argument. Take a concrete example of a cognitive task, one that re-
curs in Rowlands’ works, namely, having to transmit a rather lengthy message to 
your conspecifics (1999: 126ff; 2010: 37-41). Let us assume that such a cognitive 
task is evolutionarily determined. The non-manipulative strategy for the accom-
plishment of that task would consist, presumably, in the development and main-
tenance of at least two abilities: first, the ability to store in one’s own brain a large 
amount of information; second, the ability to recall and transmit the stored infor-
mation.  The  manipulative  strategy  would  take  a  different  path.  The  organism 
would develop the capacity to employ certain parts of the environment in order to 
accomplish the task. In other words, the organism would develop the capacity to 
offload part of the task onto external structures by developing and employing a 
system of “language.” External structures will be used in a manner analogous to 
the way that we use notepads. Once the organism acquires the capacity to store Where is my mind? 
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information in external structures and the capacity to read the information from 
such  structures,  there  is  no  need  for  the  organism  to  remember  the 
whole message.  
Which of the two strategies is more evolutionary advantageous? Rowlands’ sugges-
tion is that the manipulative strategy is more evolutionarily advantageous (1999: 
143; cf. 2010: 41). The non-manipulative strategy would require the development of 
a memory capable of storing a great amount of information. According to Row-
lands, such a development would be, in evolutionary terms, rather costly. As he 
writes,  “an  expansion  of  biological  memory  capacities  would  eventually  be  sty-
mied by considerations of evolutionary cost, energy requirements, etc” (1999: 143). 
The manipulative strategy would also result in an increased memory capacity. This 
increase, however, would not be due to the development of an advanced biological 
memory capacity. Instead, it will be the product of “the development [and use] of 
external representational systems” (144). The latter way of increasing the memory 
capacity of an organism is, according to Rowlands, more “economic” (144). Biologi-
cal capacities are evolutionarily costly. Hence, manipulative strategies, which es-
chew the expansion of biological capacities, make evolutionary sense. 
But consider what is required in performing the task at hand if the manipulative 
strategy is adopted. The organism must have developed (a) the capacity to code 
information in external structures and (b) the capacity to extract this information 
from external structures (i.e., the capacity to perform certain computations that 
allow it to read the stored information). Capacities (a) and (b) are fairly advanced 
and only organisms with a certain type of brain are capable of performing them. 
Indeed, one might argue that more biological resources – more neural structures – 
are needed in order to develop and perform (a) and (b) than to simply store and 
recall a lengthy message (see Jacob 2002). If that is so, then given Rowlands’ own 
assessment of the evolutionary costs of biological capacities, it would be the mani-
pulative strategy that turns out to be more costly. Suppose that an organism can be 
thought, for present purposes, to be analogous to a computer. Whereas the non-
manipulative strategy would result in a computer with greater storing capacity, the 
manipulative strategy would give rise to a computer with much less storing capaci-
ty but with a better processor. Judging by today’s price, it would be cheaper to up-
grade memory than processing power.  
I do not mean for this objection to be a devastating blow to the evolutionary argu-
ment. There are ways around of it. First, Rowlands could insist that there are bene-
fits associated with the manipulative strategy – benefits which I failed to mention – 
that end up making it more evolutionary advantageous. Second, Rowlands does 
not hold that every single cognitive process has to be extended, nor does he insist 
that  manipulative  strategies  are  always  more  evolutionarily  advantageous  that 
non-manipulative ones. Consequently, he could allow that natural selection did not 
favor the development of extended remembering and still maintain that evolution 
has  favored  (or  more  strongly:  resulted  in)  the  development  of  other  extended 
cognitive  processes.  Still,  neither  of  these  two  responses  undermines  the  main AVANT Volume III, Number 1/2012 www.avant.edu.pl/en 
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claim that the objection makes, namely, that the task of determining which strate-
gy is more evolutionarily advantageous is not a trivial one. Evolutionary consider-
ations should thus be used with caution. 
The evolutionary argument faces an additional, more serious problem. Suppose 
that we grant Rowlands that evolutionary considerations favor the development of 
cognitive  processes  that  include  the  manipulation  of  environmental  structures. 
Does that show that evolution has given rise to extended cognitive processes? Re-
call  that  vehicle  externalism  is  not  the  thesis  according  to  which  cognitive 
processes involve or even depend upon the use or manipulation of environmental 
structures. Rather, vehicle externalism holds that cognitive processes are consti-
tuted by the use of such structures. What Rowlands thus needs is an argument that 
shows the following: manipulated external structures become proper parts of a 
cognitive process because the evolutionary costs associated with a strategy accom-
plishing a cognitive task are reduced by the involvement and manipulation of ex-
ternal structures. But no such argument has been provided. Return to the example 
of lifting a weight. The fact that the manipulative strategy of lifting the weight is 
evolutionarily  more  advantageous  than  the  non-manipulative  strategy  does  not 
show that the lever should be considered to be a literal part of me. Similarly, why 
should the use of external structures – even if they make evolutionary sense and 
have been the products of natural selection – turn them into proper parts of cogni-
tive processes? (see also Adams and Aizawa 2010: 147-50; Rupert 2010: 149-53). 
 
3. Information Processing and Cognition 
The success of the evolutionary argument does not determine the success of Row-
lands’ position. Indeed, in The Body in Mind, Rowlands advances a different type of 
argument in support of vehicle externalism. His argument unfolds in two broad 
steps. First, he provides a characterization of cognitive process in terms of a cogni-
tive task. Specifically, he holds that “[a] process P is a cognitive process if and only 
if (i) P is essential to the accomplishing of a cognitive task T, and (ii) involves oper-
ations on information-bearing structures, where the information carried by such 
structures is relevant to task T” (1999: 102-3).
53 Second, Rowlands argues that if we 
understand cognitive process in this manner, then many cognitive processes will 
turn out to be extended. Take, for instance, visual perception and, specifically, Gib-
son’s ecological account. The optic array is an external information-bearing struc-
ture. Its structure nomically co-varies with features in the environment. As such, it 
carries  information  about  the  environment  of  the  organism.  The  organism  can 
manipulate the optic array by performing certain actions, such as moving in space 
or turning its head. In doing so, the organism makes information available to it – 
                                                           
53 Similar definitions of cognitive process are also found in Rowlands (2003) and (2006). Here, I put aside 
the biconditional formulation of Rowlands’ characterization of cognitive process and focus instead on 
the sufficient conditions that he provides. Where is my mind? 
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information that was not available prior to the manipulation of the optic array. 
The act of making information available is a form of information processing. But 
since the information that is made available to the organism by manipulating the 
optic array is essential for accomplishing a perceptual or cognitive task – for in-
stance, in determining the size of an object – we should conclude that the manipu-
lation of the optic array is a cognitive process (see 100-118). Thus, even if visual 
perception does require internal information-processing operations, the vehicles 
of perception are not purely internal. Operations on structures in the environment 
(in  this  case,  the  optic  array)  are  also  constituents  of  cognitive  or  perceptual 
processes. The lesson that Rowlands invites us to draw is this: once we permit that 
“the information processing that a perceiving organism achieves extends, in part, 
outside its skin, then it seems, we have little reason for denying that its cognitive 
processes extend in the same way” (39).  
Rowlands’ argument is, however, open to criticism. Specifically, one might argue 
that it relies on a characterization of cognitive process that is too permissive. If we 
accept Rowlands’ characterization, then too many things turn out to be cognitive. 
But it is not clear, to say the least, that those things should be counted as such. 
Suppose that I am using an abacus in order to perform an arithmetical operation. 
The abacus is an information-bearing structure and thus my use of it is a manipu-
lation of an external information-bearing structure that makes information avail-
able to me. Since, however, the use of the abacus is essential in the performance of 
a cognitive task – say, the addition of two numbers – then, assuming Rowland’s 
characterization of cognitive process, we should conclude that my manipulation of 
the abacus is a literal part of cognition. If one has doubts whether the use of an 
abacus meets the conditions that Rowlands provides, one can always run the ex-
ample with a laptop, calculator, or microscope instead.  
Assuming Rowlands’ characterization of a cognitive process, the use of an abacus 
or calculator should be taken to be a literal part of cognition. But this result turns 
out to be problematic for Rowlands’ account: it renders his account too liberal. In 
line with Rowlands (2010: 86), I shall call the objection according to which vehicle 
externalism is based on a characterization of cognition that is too (i.e., problemati-
cally) liberal the “cognitive bloat objection.” Ultimately, the objection holds that the 
conditions that Rowlands specifies as sufficient conditions for a process P to count 
as cognitive are not sufficient after all. By failing to specify sufficient conditions, 
Rowlands’ position mistakenly treats causal accompaniments of cognition as con-
stituents of cognition. If Rowlands’ characterization of cognition is accepted, then 
simply too many items become cognitive. A more stringent account of cognition or 
cognitive process is needed.  
Note that even if Rowlands were to insist that, despite appearances, his conditions 
are indeed sufficient for rendering a process cognitive, he would still need to pro-
vide reasons in support of this contention. That is especially so given that there is a 
competing view to Rowlands’ extended view which (a) maintains that “typical cog-
nitive processes depend, in surprising and complex ways on the organism’s use of AVANT Volume III, Number 1/2012 www.avant.edu.pl/en 
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resources . . . but cognition does not literally extend into the environment” (Rupert 
2010: 5); (b) accommodates the empirical findings that Rowlands cites; (c) accounts 
for the successes of cognitive psychology; and (d) unlike Rowlands’ account, nei-
ther postulates new entities as cognitive nor counts as cognitive what, prima facie, 
seems to be non-cognitive. Hence, unless there are substantial reasons that favor 
Rowlands’ extended view, one could argue that there is little or no motivation to 
choose his account over the more conservative alternative one. (For an elaboration 
of this argument, see Rupert 2010.)  
 
4. A Revised Account of Cognition: The Problem of Ownership 
In defending vehicle externalism, Rowlands is faced with a choice. He can either 
provide a more stringent characterization of cognition in the hope of avoiding the 
cognitive bloat objection, or embrace the conclusion of the cognitive bloat objec-
tion but demonstrate that there are benefits in adopting a liberal characterization 
of cognition. In The New Science of the Mind, Rowlands takes the former option and 
advances an updated and more stringent mark of the cognitive. According to Row-
lands’ most recent position, a process P is a cognitive process if it satisfies the fol-
lowing conditions: 
 
1.  P involves information processing – the manipulation and transformation of 
information-bearing structures. 
 
2.  This information processing has the proper function of making available ei-
ther to the subject or to subsequent processing operations information that 
was, prior to this processing, unavailable. 
 
3.  This information is made available by way of the production, in the subject 
of P, of a representational state.  
 
4.  P is a process that belongs to the subject of that representational state (2010: 
110-1). 
 
It is important to note that conditions (1) – (3) are still too permissive. For example, 
the processes inside my computer involve the manipulation and transformation of 
information-bearing structures, and such information processing not only has the 
proper function of making available in me information that was previously un-
available, it actually makes available this information in me by way of the produc-
tion of a representational state. The same goes for processes that are located inside 
a  network  of  computers  far  away  from  me  but  which  I  can  access  remotely 
through my smartphone. If conditions (1) – (3) were sufficient, then the processes Where is my mind? 
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of the remotely accessed computers (or at least, the processes that constitute the 
smartphone and remotely accessed computers system) would count as cognitive. 
But such a result would again give rise to the problem of cognitive bloat.
54  
In order for Rowlands’ updated mark of the cognitive to avoid counting as cogni-
tive processes that should not be counted as such, or at least processes for which 
we have no good reasons to count as cognitive, he needs more than just conditions 
(1) – (3). For Rowlands, it is condition (4) (in conjunction, of course, with [1] – [3]) 
that  can  adequately  and  accurately  demarcate  cognitive  from  non-cognitive 
processes. If conditions (1) – (4) constituted, as Rowlands holds that they do, an 
“adequate and properly motivated mark of the cognition,” then any process that 
meets conditions (1) – (4) would be correctly counted as cognitive: it would be con-
stitutive and not a mere causal accompaniment of cognition (95). Rowlands’ crite-
rion of cognition, if adequate, would then restrict the bounds of cognition so that 
processes inside computers, calculators, or microscopes would not turn out to be 
cognitive (in a sense that I explain below). Nonetheless, it would not restrict the 
bounds too much so as to exclude the use of extended processes from being cogni-
tive.  
But how should we understand condition (4)? That is, what does it mean for a sub-
ject to own a process that meets conditions (1) – (3)? Given the distinction between 
personal-level processes and subpersonal-level processes, the question or problem 
of ownership of cognitive processes arises for both types of processes. Regarding 
subpersonal-level  processes,  Rowlands  suggests  that  their  ownership  should  be 
understood  in  terms  of  the  idea  of  integration.  Specifically,  a  subpersonal-level 
process Psub belongs to a subject only if Psub is “appropriately integrated into the 
subject” and Psub is appropriately integrated only if “it makes some contribution to 
the  personal-level  cognitive  life  of  the  subject”  (151;  147).  The  proposed  under-
standing of the ownership of subpersonal-level processes requires, however, that 
we already have an account of ownership for personal-level processes. After all, to 
evaluate whether a subpersonal-level process makes a contribution to the person-
al-level cognitive life of a subject, one must already be in position to make sense of 
the idea that the subject has or owns a cognitive life. 
The problem of ownership for subpersonal-level processes thus leads to the prob-
lem  of  ownership  for  personal-level  processes.  Rowlands’  solution  to  the  latter 
problem  unfolds  in  three  steps.  First,  he  invites  us  to  think  of  personal-level 
processes as activities that can be subsumed under a “general activity-type” (152).  
                                                           
54 Of course, a proponent of vehicle externalism could insist that those processes should be counted as 
cognitive. As mentioned before, the problem with such a liberal account of cognition is that it needs to 
be accompanied with a story as to why we should switch from an understanding of cognition that does 
not count processes inside computers as cognitive to a more liberal one that does. Does the liberal 
account of cognition accommodate empirical data better than the more conservative account? Or is 
such  a  liberal  account  in  agreement  with  the  mandates  and  practice  of  cognitive  science?  Without 
answers  to  those  questions  it  is  hard  to  see  what  the  benefits  of  changing  our  understanding  of 
cognition might be. AVANT Volume III, Number 1/2012 www.avant.edu.pl/en 
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Second, he suggests that we can provide a preliminary solution to the problem of 
ownership by determining the way in which we can own this general activity-type 
(151ff.). Finally, he argues that we own this general activity-type when we have 
epistemic  authority  over  it.  As  a  result,  a  subject  owns  a  personal-level  process 
when the subject has epistemic authority over that process.  
It is important to emphasize that this is only Rowlands’ preliminary solution to the 
problem  of  ownership.  As  he  insists,  the  idea  of  epistemic  authority  is  merely 
symptomatic of a more fundamental feature of cognition – and it is to that feature 
that we need to turn in order to solve the ownership problem (156ff.; 163-5). Hav-
ing said that, epistemic authority is still assumed by Rowlands to be “a reasonably 
reliable accompaniment of personal-level processes that we own” (157). Further-
more, even if the idea of epistemic authority does not provide the final answer to 
the problem ownership, Rowlands still holds that the idea of epistemic authority 
suffices to provide a solution to the cognitive bloat objection.  
Indeed, assuming that the notion of epistemic authority is a reliable guide to own-
ership  of  personal-level  processes,  Rowlands  can  deny  that  processes  occurring 
inside computers or microscopes are personal-level cognitive processes. Condition 
(4) is not met, for we do not have epistemic authority over such processes (155). 
Nonetheless, the very same processes can turn out to be subpersonal-level cogni-
tive process, if a subject subpersonally owns them. All that is required is for those 
processes to be “appropriately integrated into the subject’s (personal-level) psycho-
logical life” (155). In effect, Rowlands responds to the cognitive bloat objection by 
treating it as two separate objections: one applying to subpersonal-level processes 
and  one  applying  to  personal-level  processes.  In  regards  to  subpersonal-level 
processes, Rowlands admits that there is cognitive bloat, but such bloat turns out to 
be innocuous. Processes inside computers, telescopes or smartphones can be sub-
personally cognitive, if they are properly integrated into the psychological life of a 
subject. Yet, their cognitive status should be understood as being “on a par with, 
for  example,  the  operations  that  transform  the  raw  primal  sketch  into  the  full 
primal sketch” (155). To admit cognitive bloat of this sort does not amount to say-
ing that “the processes occurring inside telescope, calculator, or computer are cog-
nitive processes on a par with perceiving, remembering, reasoning, and thinking” 
(155). That would be true only if there was cognitive bloat on the personal-level. 
But since ownership of personal-level processes is more demanding than owner-
ship of subpersonal-level processes, personal-level cognitive bloat is avoided. Per-
ceiving, remembering, reasoning, and thinking do not occur inside telescopes, cal-
culators, or computers.  
A complete evaluation of Rowlands’ solution to the problem of cognitive bloat will 
have to wait until the next section. However, enough has been said to allow me to 
voice two concerns regarding Rowlands’ solution. First, I am not convinced that 
the idea of epistemic authority does the work that Rowlands wants it to do, i.e., Where is my mind? 
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that it either reliably picks out personal-level cognitive processes or that it is a reli-
able accompaniment of such processes. This problem with the idea of epistemic 
authority, I wish to argue, has consequences for Rowlands’ solution to the cognitive 
bloat problem. Let me explain. Rowlands explicates the notion of epistemic author-
ity with the use of the following example (152-4). Consider the activity of building a 
home and specifically that of laying bricks. According to Rowlands, one has epis-
temic authority over the activity of laying bricks when one is “acquainted with the 
bricks in all relevant and necessary ways” and when one can discern “the charac-
teristics  of  good  mortar”  (153).  Suppose  that  when  it  comes  to  laying  bricks  or 
building a house epistemic authority is indeed a “tolerably reliable indicator” of 
the ownership of such activities (155). We still need to examine whether epistemic 
authority over personal-level cognitive processes is a reliable indicator of owner-
ship of such processes.  
Consider thinking. In the case of bricks or mortar, epistemic authority amounts to 
knowledge about characteristics of bricks and mortar. But in the case of reasoning, 
knowing whether a reasoning pattern is valid or invalid, for instance, does not 
make that pattern of reasoning mine. Furthermore, I can own a thinking process, 
i.e., I can be its author, even if I do not know whether such a process embodies a 
reasoning pattern that is valid or invalid. Or consider remembering. What is the 
epistemic authority that I have over  such personal-level cognitive process? Is it 
knowledge of certain characteristics of the products of such process, i.e. memo-
ries? It does not seem likely. Knowledge of memories does not seem to be sufficient 
in order to render such memories mine. Arguably, I can know plenty about the 
memories  of  someone  else.  Perhaps,  epistemic  authority  over  remembering 
amounts to a more specific kind of knowing: either knowing how to recreate im-
aginatively  (aspects  of)  memories  or  knowledge  that  memories  have  a  specific 
phenomenal character when recalled. This proposal fares better, but still it does 
not seem quite right. The former suggestion appears to be incongruous with what 
the laying-bricks example suggests epistemic authority to be. In what sense is the 
ability  to  recreate  in  imagination  (aspects  of)  my  memories  something  that  de-
serves  the  label  epistemic?  In  the  laying-brick  example,  epistemic  authority 
amounts to knowledge that the bricks have certain characteristics, not to the abili-
ty of laying bricks in a certain way. If we take the latter suggestion, then it is worth 
asking  whether  it  is  (logically)  possible  that  a  subject  A  might  imaginatively 
recreate (aspects of) memories of a different subject, say, B. In other words, is it 
possible for two subjects to undergo two phenomenally identical experiences? It 
certainly seems so and if such a case were to take place, we would not claim, I take 
it, that A owns B’s process of remembering. I should point out that Rowlands does 
not hold that having epistemic authority over a process is a sufficient condition for 
owning that process. Thus, he could allow for the possibility of a subject who has 
epistemic authority over remembering – insofar as the subject has the ability to 
imaginatively recreate memories – but who does not own that process of remem-
bering. But even if Rowlands can circumvent this (logical) issue, there is an addi-
tional issue that needs to be addressed: if we agree that epistemic authority over AVANT Volume III, Number 1/2012 www.avant.edu.pl/en 
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the process of remembering is to be understood in terms of the ability to imagina-
tively recreate (aspects  of) memories, then we  need  to investigate  the  extent to 
which subjects are capable of performing such a task. If it turns out that subjects 
are typically bad at performing such a task, then it will also turn out that epistemic 
authority is neither a reliable indicator nor an accompaniment of ownership.
55  
Perhaps a more fruitful way of understanding epistemic authority might be to look 
at cases in which one lacks epistemic authority. I could only find one instance in 
which Rowlands is explicit about what a lack of epistemic authority over a process 
amounts to. He writes: “I am not author of, but hostage to, the processes that, for 
example, transform the raw primal sketch into the full primal sketch” (155). But 
even this understanding of epistemic authority needs further refinement. In what 
sense am I the author of the (personal-level) process of perceiving? Or am I not, at 
least  often,  hostage  to  certain  thoughts,  emotions,  and  even  decision-making 
processes? (See, for instance, Miller 1962; Neisser 1967; Latané and Darley 1970; 
Isen and Levin 1972; Carver et al. 1983; Bargh et al. 1996; Bargh and Ferguson 2000; 
Fazio 2001; Keizer et al. 2008; and Bargh and Morsella 2009.) Would we, then, dis-
count  those  thoughts,  emotions,  and  decision-making  processes  as  personal?  I 
think not. 
The above considerations can be summarized in the form of a dilemma: either 
there is a correlation between epistemic authority over a personal-level cognitive 
processes and ownership of such a process, or there is not. If the former, then cer-
tain paradigmatic cognitive processes such as remembering or thinking would no 
longer be taken to be personal-level cognitive processes. Such a result, however, 
undermines the value of the notion of epistemic authority. If the latter, then the 
fact that we lack epistemic authority over processes inside computers or telescopes 
should not lead us to conclude that such processes are not personal-level cognitive 
processes. As a consequence, Rowlands’ position remains vulnerable to the cogni-
tive bloat objection.  
There is potentially an additional problem with Rowlands’ proposed solution to the 
problem  of  cognitive  bloat  and  specifically  with  his  claim  that  processes  inside 
computers or telescopes could count as cognitive. Recall that for Rowlands a sub-
personal-level process is appropriately integrated only if “it makes some contribu-
tion to the personal-level cognitive life of the subject” (147). I think that Rowlands 
is correct to hold that some kind of integration (i.e., contribution to the personal-
level cognitive life of the subject) is sufficient for rendering a subpersonal-level 
process cognitive. Still, it is important not to lose sight of the fact that integration 
                                                           
55 One might suggest that epistemic authority over the processes of remembering or thinking amounts 
to knowledge that either the processes themselves, or the products of such processes, are mine. But this 
does not help. Epistemic authority over a process Pper cannot just be knowledge of the fact that Pper 
belongs to me, nor can it be knowledge of the fact that the products of Pper belong to me. The claim that 
a process Pper (or a product of Pper) is mine if I know that Pper (or a product of Pper) is mine, does not solve 
the problem of ownership. It only postpones it. Where is my mind? 
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comes in degrees. That is to say, although some kind of integration might be suffi-
cient for rendering a process subpersonally cognitive, another kind of integration 
might not.  
Recently there has been great success in the implementation and use of neural 
interface  systems  for  restoring  mobility  for  people  with  long-standing  paralysis 
(see, e.g., Donoghue 2008; Gilja et al. 2011; Scwartz et al. 2006; and Green & Kalaska 
2011). After having been implanted with a device that could record and transmit 
neural firing patterns, subjects were able to perform certain types of movements. 
In a remarkable case, a subject suffering from a long-standing tetraplegia was able 
to move and control a robotic arm just by willing to move the robotic arm (Hoch-
berg et al. 2012). In this case, it seems that the processes of the device that records 
and transmits the relevant neural firing patterns should be counted as cognitive 
and that is precisely for the reasons that Rowlands advances: the processes are 
appropriately integrated in the cognitive life of the subject for they allow the sub-
ject to perform certain movements or tasks.  
Now, contrast the provided example with Rowlands’ example of processes located 
inside computers or telescopes. What I would like to suggest is that in the case of 
neural interface systems, the implanted device that facilitates the movement of a 
robotic arm is integrated in the cognitive life of the organism to a greater extent 
than processes located inside telescopes or computers – but not because one is lo-
cated intracranially whereas the other is not. The implanted device needs to be 
calibrated to the subject. That is, there is a necessary and often long training phase 
during which the device records the neural firing patterns of the subject in order 
to be able to translate them into control signals. The implanted device is hence 
subject-specific. And by being subject-specific, the device can be said, in a rather 
meaningful sense, to belong to the subject. There does not seem to be an equivalent 
training phase for computers or telescopes -- there might a phase during which one 
learns how to use a computer or a telescope, but not a phase during which the 
computer or telescope becomes calibrated to the subject. That is corroborated by 
the fact that different computers or different telescopes can be treated, for certain 
purposes, as interchangeable. I can check my email, for example, on all sorts of 
computers, but I cannot use all kinds of neural interface systems (cf. Sterelny 2010: 
475-477).  
My point here is not that Rowlands is mistaken in thinking that processes inside 
computers  could  turn  out  to  be  cognitive  if  certain  conditions  are  met.  Rather, 
what I wish to point out is that the conditions for ownership of subpersonal-level 
cognitive processes demand better articulation. Given that there can be substantial 
differences in the way in which two processes can be integrated in the psychologi-
cal life of a subject, the concept of integration needs to be further delineated. Spe-
cifically, how much integration is enough integration to make a process subperso-
nally cognitive? The absence of such an articulation may invite proponents of ve-
hicle  externalism  to  deny  the  cognitive  status  of  processes  inside  computers  or 
telescopes.  In  fact,  they  might  hold  that  such  processes  are  integrated  but  not AVANT Volume III, Number 1/2012 www.avant.edu.pl/en 
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enough. That is to say, they are not integrated to the extent to which implanted 
neural interface devices are integrated in the psychological life of the subject. Con-
sequently, they should not be counted as cognitive 
 
5. Intentionality as Revealing Activity 
The notion of epistemic authority is used by Rowlands only to provide a prelimi-
nary  solution  to  the  problem  of  ownership  when  it  comes  to  personal-level 
process. As Rowlands makes clear, epistemic authority is not a criterion for per-
sonal-level ownership. And although it is a “reasonably reliable accompaniment of 
personal-level  processes  that  we  own,”  epistemic  authority  is  symptomatic  of 
something more basic or fundamental (2010: 157). Indeed, the core of idea of own-
ership is to be found in the idea of revelation or disclosure:  
 
The idea of revelation or disclosure supplies the ultimate basis for our own-
ership of cognitive processes. There is no such thing as revelation or disclo-
sure in itself. Disclosure is always disclosure to someone or some thing. Per-
sonal-level disclosure is disclosure to someone; subpersonal disclosure is dis-
closure to something (163).   
Furthermore, cognition, Rowlands tells us, is a revealing or a disclosing activity 
because it is intentional. Hence, in order to fully understand and solve the problem 
of ownership, we need to understand intentionality. In fact, the task of delineating 
the  nature  of  intentionality  carries  for  Rowlands  a  double  significance.  First,  it 
should provide us with an understanding of ownership more fundamental than 
that provided by the idea of epistemic authority. Second, it should demonstrate the 
truth  of  vehicle  externalism.  As  Rowlands  writes,  “the  ideas  that  cognitive 
processes  should  be  embodied  and  extended  are  utterly  quotidian  –  practically 
banal implications of a proper understanding of intentionality” (164). 
What is thus the proper understanding of intentionality? It is helpful to first con-
sider the nature of our experiences. According to Rowlands, experiences “are not 
just items of which we are aware;” they are also “items in virtue of which we are 
aware,  both  of  non-mental  objects  and  their  properties  and  also  of  other  expe-
riences” (169). Experiences, in other words, “are not just object of awareness, but 
also acts” (169). But insofar as experiences are also items in virtue of which we are 
aware  of  something,  then  there  will  always  be  something  of  which  we  are  not 
aware – something that cannot be turned into an object of experience. (Indeed, 
even if we were to turn the items in virtue of which we are aware of something 
into an object of awareness – that is, even if we were to turn the act of experience 
into an object of experience –the very attempt to do so would require a new act.) 
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Rowlands argues that a similar conclusion applies to the idea of mode of presenta-
tion – as this is found in the standard account of intentionality according to which 
intentionality has a threefold structure: act, object, and mode of presentation. Row-
lands’ view is that a mode of presentation can be understood both as that of which 
we are aware and as that in virtue of which we are aware (183ff.). Of these two 
ways of understanding a mode of presentation, it is the latter that captures the 
essence  of  intentionality:  intentionality  is  best  understood  as  that  in  virtue  of 
which we are made aware of objects or as a type of revelation or disclosure. Inso-
far as experiences and cognition are intentional, they are types of revelation or 
disclosure; but insofar as “disclosing is, in general, indifferent to its location,” cog-
nitive and perceptual processes are extended (187).  
What are the consequences of Rowlands’ argument, assuming it to be sound? That 
is, suppose that we grant that (a) the transcendental conditions of cognition are not 
items of which we are aware, (b) these conditions constitute a form of disclosing or 
revealing,  and  (c)  theoretically  and  abstractly  speaking,  disclosing  is  location-
independent insofar as its vehicles are location-independent. Having assumed all 
of that, have we shown that cognition extends? Yes, but in a sense which will be 
granted by a good deal of opponents of vehicle externalism. That is because what 
we have shown is the possibility of extended cognition. Nonetheless, the debate 
surrounding vehicle externalism is primarily a debate about whether cognition is 
actually extended or embodied. After all, if what we were after were the conclu-
sion that it is possible that cognition is extended, then the truth of the thesis of 
functionalism would have sufficed in establishing such a conclusion. Hence, what 
Rowlands needs to demonstrate is that some of the aspects of intentionality in vir-
tue of which things are  disclosed to us are located (at least, partly)  outside the 
boundaries of the brain. Or since the kind of disclosure relevant to the vehicles of 
cognition is causal and not constitutive (191-196), Rowlands needs to show that the 
“causal disclosure of the world does not take place purely inside the head of a sub-
ject” (195). 
Rowlands does provide examples of what he takes to be extended vehicles of cog-
nition: the cane of a blind person (196-198), saccadic eye movements (202-203), the 
activities  involved  in  the  identification  of  sensorimotor  contingencies  (204-205), 
and the manipulation of the optic array (205-206). According to Rowlands, these 
examples count as extended vehicles of cognition because they are external and 
causally disclose the world to the subject. But just as with the notion of integration, 
I suspect that skeptics of vehicle externalism will find the notion of causal disclo-
sure to be in need of further articulation. It seems unlikely that every entity that 
causally contributes to the disclosure of a personal-level state is an entity in virtue 
of which things are disclosed to us. If causal disclosure is understood so broadly, 
then, arguably, the sun would have to be considered as a vehicle of cognition. Row-
lands, I think, needs to restrict causal disclosure to entities that meet certain condi-
tions. This requirement, however, ultimately takes us back to the search for an 
adequate mark of the cognitive. But the crucial condition of Rowlands’ own mark AVANT Volume III, Number 1/2012 www.avant.edu.pl/en 
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of the cognitive, i.e., condition (4), does not seem to be of help: either ownership is 
understood derivatively in terms of epistemic authority, or it is understood as a 
feature of disclosure (214-217). If the former, then, as I suggested in the previous 
section,  it  is  unclear  to  what  the  relationship  between  epistemic  authority  and 
ownership amounts. If the latter, then the notion of ownership is unhelpful in de-
marcating the relevant causal contributions from the irrelevant, for ownership is 
itself given in terms of causal disclosure. As Rowlands himself states, “[a]t the per-
sonal level, a cognitive process is mine when it causally discloses the world to me” 
(216). The notion of ownership, if understood in terms of causal disclosure, cannot 
be used to  explicate causal disclosure. Thus, neither  solution to  the problem  of 
ownership seems to yield a criterion of cognition which is accurate, properly moti-
vated, and that shows that cognitive processes are extended. To be more precise, 
neither solution to the problem of ownership as presented in Rowlands (2010) se-
cures vehicle externalism. Of course, that is not to say that a future articulation of 
ownership will not succeed in establishing Rowlands’ desired conclusion. Given 
the writings of Rowlands so far, one can expect that such an attempt to vindicate 
vehicle externalism is forthcoming.  
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